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Research highlights 
 This study investigates stakeholders’ effect on the performance measurement system 
(PMS). 
 We combine stakeholder (SHT) and resource-dependency (RDT) theories. 
 The conflicting interests of stakeholders affected PMS design.  
 The conflicting interests did not result in multiple key targets in PMS use.  
 One nonfinancial indicator became the most important key target.   
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Abstract: Stakeholder theory (SHT) emphasizes that different stakeholders and their interests 
need to be identified and addressed to maximize firm performance. This emphasis can make 
the design of performance measurement systems (PMS) challenging because the interests of 
stakeholders are often in conflict. Based on previous research and using stakeholder and 
resource dependency theories, we develop a theoretical model suggesting that resource 
dependency acts as a “filter” in selecting which of the PMS design measures are emphasized 
for decision making.  We find various conflicting interests between stakeholders in our case 
organization (a unit of University of Applied Sciences in Finland) that affected PMS design. 
Contrary to the earlier studies, however, we found that despite conflicting interests, all of the 
different stakeholders considered one nonfinancial indicator to be the most important: 
attractiveness, or the number of applicants divided by number of new students. As suggested 
by resource-dependency theory (RDT), the stakeholder providing the most resources had the 
most significant impact on the selection of the key performance indicators used. The key 
resource provider may also have had some effect on the expectations of other stakeholders.   
Keywords: Performance measurement, stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory, 
public sector, case study. 
Corresponding Author: Dr. Aapo Länsiluoto, Ph.D. 
  
3 
1. Introduction 
Stakeholder theory (SHT) argues that the utility of a large number of different 
stakeholders, in addition to the shareholders, is maximized as the firm tries to integrate its 
needs through the creation of multiple objectives (Christopher, 2010; see also Freeman et al., 
2004). SHT has been applied frequently in earlier accounting studies (Orij, 2010; Mäkelä and 
Näsi, 2010), although almost all of these studies address social responsibility issues (Camara 
et al., 2009).1 A few studies have applied SHT to investigate the stakeholder effect on the 
design of performance measurement systems (PMS).2 These include applying SHT to 
investigating the development of financial reports (Camara et al., 2009), identifying primary 
and secondary objectives (Atkinson et al., 1997), designing a PMS in a Chinese case 
company (Li and Tang, 2009), and balancing multiple objectives in a balanced scorecard 
(BSC) (Sundin et al., 2010). The paucity of studies indicates a need for further research on 
performance measurement using SHT.  
Previous studies have found that the interests of various stakeholders may lead to an 
organization’s PMS design having a high number of different objectives and measures (Li 
and Tang, 2009; see also Arnaboldi and Azzone, 2010; Ax and Bjørnenak, 2005; Micheli and 
Manzoni, 2010). The balanced scorecard approach helps to balance the multiple and 
                                                 
1 Recently, SHT has been utilized in social disclosure (Orij, 2010) or social responsibility (Mäkelä and Näsi, 
2010), environmental audits (Darnall et al., 2009), corporate governance (Collier, 2008), and accounting 
textbook studies (Ferguson et al., 2005). The origin of ‘stakeholder’ in the management literature can be traced 
back to 1963, when it appeared in an international memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute. In the 
organization theory literature, Rhenman (1964 and 1968) used the term stakeholders to designate the individuals 
or groups which depend on the company for the realization of their personal goals and on whom the company is 
dependent. 
2 Generally, PMS are expected to have several different positive effects (see for instance Kaplan and Norton, 
1996; Kraus and Lind, 2010; Li and Tang, 2009; Sundin et al., 2010). The PMS can be used to align strategy 
and operations, coordinate and influence employee behavior, balance different objectives, and finally improve 
organizational performance. 
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competing objectives (Sundin et al., 2010). On the other hand, previous studies have also 
shown that PMS design and PMS use are two different concepts (Ferreira and Otley, 2009; 
Kraus and Lind, 2010; Micheli and Manzoni, 2010, Mouritsen, 2005; see also Sundin et al., 
2010).3 For instance, Kraus and Lind (2010) found that although PMS design may include a 
large number of different financial and nonfinancial measures, only certain financial 
measures are actually used for corporate level control. These financial objectives are 
sometimes called “primary objectives” (e.g. Atkinson et al., 1997) to emphasize their 
importance.  
The apparent conflict between SHT driving multiple objectives in PMS design while 
PMS use focuses on only a few primary financial objectives motivates the primary research 
question for this study:  If the interests of various stakeholders are considered in the PMS 
design, why is PMS use limited to a few primary measures? Prior research suggests it may be 
that PMS are used to satisfy expectations of key stakeholders (Micheli and Manzoni, 2010) or 
to maintain the legitimacy of the organization (Modell, 2009). Resource-dependency theory 
(RDT) predicts that those stakeholders whose resources are the most critical will have the 
highest impact on the targets used in the PMS (Christopher, 2010; Hillman et al., 2009; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). In this study, we investigate whether RDT helps explain why 
PMS use is limited to a relatively few performance measures in a public sector organization 
(i.e., a public university). We identify the performance measures included in the PMS and 
which measures are key to the organization. We also describe the stakeholders and their 
interests, and investigate how they influence PMS design and usage. The effects on other 
stakeholders whose interests are not reflected in PMS use are studied to determine the 
consequences.  
                                                 
3 The widely cited study of Simons (1995) dichotomizes use of PMS as interactive and diagnostic (see for 
instance Micheli and Manzoni, 2010).  
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This study contributes to the PMS literature in several ways. The major finding and 
contribution of the study is that the conflicting interests of stakeholders do not necessarily 
lead to a large number of key indicators used for decision making, which contradicts the basic 
proposition of stakeholder theory. We develop a theoretical model suggesting that the process 
of selecting the key indicators is complex and that resource dependency acts as a “filter” in 
selecting certain measures as primary. This case organization’s stakeholders and their 
expectations are described in more detail than earlier studies (e.g. Atkinson et al., 1997; 
Kraus and Lind, 2010; Li and Tang, 2009; Sundin et al., 2010). We find ample evidence that 
the resources supplied by certain stakeholders significantly impacted the key measure 
focused on (Christopher, 2010; Hillman et al., 2009) and discuss how it happened at the case 
organization. Various key stakeholders of the university considered one nonfinancial 
indicator to be very important: attractiveness, or the number of applicants divided by number 
of new students. This finding differs from the typical for-profit firm focusing on net income 
as the single key indicator and assuming it takes care of all stakeholder interests. Here, 
attractiveness is a major leading indicator of financial results as well as a crucial measure of 
survival for individual campuses within the university system.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss prior PMS studies using SHT and 
RDT and establish a theoretical foundation for our research question and model. Second, we 
describe the methodology used for this exploratory qualitative case study. Third, we present 
empirical results which identify stakeholders, their interests, and the resources they provide to 
the case organization, as well as what measures are included in the PMS design and why a 
single nonfinancial measure is the key metric used. Next, we discuss the results and 
contributions of this study in light of prior research and theory.  Finally, we provide 
conclusions, limitations, and implications for further research.  
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2. Prior studies and theoretical foundation 
2.1 Stakeholder theory  
This study applies stakeholder theory (SHT) because it enables identifying different 
stakeholders (e.g. Darnall et al., 2009), investigating their various interests (e.g. Christopher, 
2010), learning how these sometimes competing interests are managed (Collier, 2008), and 
determining the key performance indicators (KPI) of the different stakeholders (e.g. Atkinson 
et al., 1997; Li and Tang, 2009; Sundin et al., 2010).  
The definition of stakeholder by Freeman (1984) is widely applied (e.g. Christopher, 
2010; Collier, 2008; Darnall et al., 2009). According to Freeman (1984, 46), a stakeholder is 
“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives.” In addition to Freeman’s (1984) definition, Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) have further developed the definition as “persons or groups with legitimate 
interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity.” Stakeholders need to 
be identified first if SHT is to be applied (see for instance Collier, 2008).4 Stakeholders 
usually include shareholders, managers, lenders, institutional investors, employees, 
government, creditors/suppliers, debtors, customers, analysts and other wider issues (i.e., 
natural environment, general public, community, society) (Atkinson et al., 1997; Darnall et 
al., 2009; Ferguson et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2004; Waddock et al., 2002).  
Different stakeholders participate in the operations of organizations because they want 
to obtain something which benefits their own objectives (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The 
interests of stakeholders can be either competing or common. The challenge for managers in 
                                                 
4 Several different alternatives are available for categorizing stakeholders (e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Stakeholders can be cooperative/competitive (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), environmental/process (Atkinson 
et al., 1997), internal/external (Darnall et al., 2009), owner/non-owner (Li and Tang, 2009), or 
primary/secondary (Waddock et al., 2002). Finally, stakeholders can be categorized by their interests and power 
(Ackermann and Eden, 2011) or by forces which affect an organization (Collier, 2008).   
7 
following stakeholder theory is how to specify and make tradeoffs between the conflicting 
and inconsistent demands of different stakeholders besides just shareholders (Sundin et al., 
2010; Jensen, 2001; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In particular, managing multiple 
objectives has been criticized (Jensen, 2001; Li and Tang, 2009; Sundin et al., 2010). Li and 
Tang (2009, p. 194) claim that “stakeholder theory fails to provide corporate managers with a 
single objective, which might result in managerial confusion, conflict, or even competitive 
failure.” Also, Jensen (2001) proposes that “since it is logically impossible to maximize more 
than one dimension, purposeful action requires a single valued objective function.” Contrary 
to Li and Tang (2009) and Jensen (2001), Freeman et al. (2004) propose that having one 
objective makes governance and management difficult if not impossible due to the world’s 
complexity. On the other hand, maximizing shareholders’ wealth in the long-term may 
indicate that the interests of other stakeholders are being considered (see for instance 
Christopher, 2010).  
2.2 Prior performance measurement studies with SHT 
SHT has been applied to investigating PMS in earlier studies (Atkinson et al., 1997; 
Li and Tang, 2009; Sundin et al., 2010). These three studies all suggest that stakeholders may 
affect the design of PMS.5 Each study gathered qualitative data from a single company and 
used either action research (Li and Tang, 2009), exploratory (Sundin et al., 2010), or 
illustrative (Atkinson et al., 1997) case study approaches. Atkinson et al. (1997) analyze both 
primary and secondary objectives for four different groups of stakeholders—shareholders, 
customers, employees and community—at the Bank of Montreal. Li and Tang (2009) studied 
                                                 
5 Different stakeholders may have a different effect on other types of management control systems besides PMS. 
For instance, Darnall et al. (2009) found that environmental audits used by organizations are positively 
associated with perceived influence from internal, regulatory, and supply chain stakeholders. However, 
environmental audit use was not related to the perceived influence from societal stakeholders (Darnall et al., 
2009). 
8 
a large Chinese state-owned firm and propose a stakeholder framework which illustrates how 
PMS design is affected by owners and non-owners. According to the framework of Li and 
Tang (2009), owners define objectives, strategy and critical performance variables which are 
affected by the contributions and expectations of non-owner stakeholders.  
The balanced scorecard (BSC) approach has been found to help balance multiple and 
competing stakeholder objectives. Sundin et al. (2010) found the BSC approach was effective 
in balancing the desires of various stakeholders in an electric utility company. These findings 
support the Ax and Bjørnenak (2005) proposition that the BSC can be applied to balance the 
needs of different stakeholders such as owners, customers, and employees.6 Sundin et al. 
(2010) also found other factors besides the BSC were helpful for balancing objectives, 
including explicit desire for balance, stakeholders’ ability to exert pressure, other formal 
management control systems, and organizational culture and leadership.  
A potential limitation of the BSC approach is that it has been found to have limited 
impact on control, i.e., PMS use. The results of Kraus and Lind (2010) indicate that 
nonfinancial indicators are not as intensively used as expected although the organization 
designed them into the BSC. They found that the Swedish companies used financially-
focused measures for control in corporate-level. Moreover, they found that financial 
indicators (i.e., ROCE, EBITDA, and EBIT) were most important. Standards were only set 
for financial measures and rewards were largely based on these financial performance 
measures. Kraus and Lind (2010) explain some internal and external reasons for financial-
oriented control. Internal reasons relate to simplicity and comparability between business 
units and competitors. External reasons relate to capital market and pressures from analysts 
who were assumed to be interested only financial accounting measures. Therefore, the results 
                                                 
6 According to Ax and Bjørnenak (2005), PMS design usually included the employee perspective in the Swedish 
public sector organizations. 
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of Kraus and Lind (2010) suggest that only certain stakeholders have a significant impact on 
the key PMS measures used for decision making even though the PMS design may have a 
large number of different measures.   
Together these prior studies indicate that stakeholders do affect PMS design and use. 
However, what is still not understood is why some stakeholders seem to have more impact on 
the primary measures than other stakeholders. One potential explanation is provided by 
resource dependency theory as explained next.  
2.3 Resource dependency theory  
According to Frooman (1999), two parameters affect how much power the 
stakeholders may have concerning the organization and its PMS design: how dependent the 
organization is on the stakeholder and how dependent the stakeholder is on the organization. 
Based on this framework, the stakeholder has the most power when the firm is highly 
dependent on the stakeholder. The degree of dependence on the stakeholder can be 
investigated through resource dependency theory (RDT). According to RDT, a stakeholder’s 
ability to exert pressure may stem from its ability to provide resources.  
The resource is a fundamental concept in RDT because organizations require 
resources to operate. Organizations are linked to different environments (such as federations, 
associations, customer-suppliers, competitive relationships) to acquire needed resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, p. 2). The resources might be provided internally or externally. 
A balance sheet illustrates some of the resources that organizations own relating to assets, 
liabilities, and shareholders’ equity. But there can also be several other different assets such 
as physical, human, procedural, or marketing assets not reported on the balance sheet 
(Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Any of these various assets can be critical to 
the success of the enterprise.  
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Previous studies have investigated how resources affect control systems. Abernethy 
and Chua (1996) find institutional pressure in a hospital organization was exerted primarily 
through powerful state funding agencies which provided 90 percent of the organization’s 
financial resources. This pressure led to changes in different aspects of the management 
control system. Frooman (1999) proposes that if stakeholder power is high then the 
stakeholder will choose a direct withholding strategy to influence the firm. Frooman (1999) 
defines withholding as a situation “where the stakeholder discontinues providing a resource 
to a firm with the intention of making the firm change a certain behavior.” Also, Kamminga 
and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007) illustrate three different management control patterns for 
joint venture control. These different control patterns were affected by the type of resources, 
(i.e., their measurability and specificity). In his statistical study, Dekker (2008) found 
resource dependence relating positively and significantly to governance extensiveness. These 
studies support the basic idea of RDT by showing that resource dependence has impact on 
control systems.  
Organizations have applied several different alternatives to cope with the environment 
and decrease their resource dependency. According to Hillman et al. (2009; see also Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 2003), these alternatives relate to, for instance, mergers and acquisitions, joint 
ventures, boards of directors, political action and executive succession. The role of the board 
seems to be the most interesting for this study. RDT suggests that the board of directors can 
manage internal and external environmental dependencies (Christopher, 2010; Hillman et al., 
2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  
Previous studies have suggested combining RDT and SHT in future studies but they 
have not proposed specific dependencies or collected empirical data (Christopher, 2010; 
Hillman et al., 2009). Although RDT is applied extensively in earlier studies, RDT seems to 
be a valuable addition to SHT because both theories recognize the organizations’ 
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interdependence on internal and external stakeholders (Hillman et al., 2009). Hillman et al. 
(2009) suggests that earlier RDT studies have not specified which resource dependencies are 
the most important if multiple important dependencies exist. In conjunction with the 
proposition by Hillman et al. (2009), Christopher (2010) constructs a multi-theoretical 
framework for investigating the forces impacting organizations including four theories: 
agency, resource dependency, stakeholder, and stewardship theories. Christopher (2010) 
recommends validating the multi-theoretical framework because empirical data was not used.  
2.4 A Theoretical framework 
Building upon prior research and following the suggestions of Hillman et al. (2009) 
and Christopher (2010), we integrate RDT and SHT into a theoretical framework. Figure 1 
summarizes our theoretical framework describing how stakeholders and their resources affect 
the process of selecting key performance indicators. First, as suggested by SHT, all 
organizations have many stakeholders with both common and conflicting interests.  These 
interests lead to multiple measures in the design of PMS as the organization strives to meet 
these interests.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
However, as proposed by RDT, the organization is dependent on the resources 
provided by certain stakeholders and not dependent (or less dependent) on others. This 
dependence leads to certain key measures being filtered out from among the large number of 
measures based on the resource criticality of the stakeholders. The more critical the resources 
provided by a stakeholder, the more important are their interests for the organization, leading 
to the use of measures relating to those interests for decision making.  
Our theory for why some measures in the PMS design are used and others are not 
used is different from institutional theory, which argues that firms may ceremoniously 
conform to a directive of the parent company, such as measures in the PMS design (Siti-
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Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Those 
ceremoniously institutionalized routines, or “organizational rituals,” help preserve the status 
quo and the power or interests of specific groups or individuals, rather than aid decision 
making. In contrast, our model for which measures are used for decision making is based on 
resource dependency rather than ownership or institutionalism. First, the measures in the 
PMS design are driven by diverse stakeholders with often conflicting interests, including 
those measures used for decisions. Second, it is the higher level of resources provided by 
certain stakeholders that put their interests and related performance measures higher on the 
priority list. This filtering process should be especially keen in public sector or non-profit 
organizations that are totally dependent on financing from external sources rather than 
generating their own income.   
Finally, the use of these key measures will have both desirable and undesirable 
consequences for the case organization and its stakeholders. The organization is expected to 
benefit through increased resources to implement firm strategy, higher motivation and 
learning (Micheli and Manzoni 2010), or higher profitability (e.g. Atkinson et al. 1997). 
Stakeholders providing significant resources and others with common goals will benefit 
through firm decisions that are more consistent with their interests. On the other hand, we 
expect less desirable consequences for those stakeholders not providing significant resources 
(or with conflicting interests from those that do) to the firm and perhaps for the long-term 
success of the organization. These outcomes include important stakeholder interests not being 
met (e.g., local economies) or risks to the long-term viability of the organization itself (e.g., 
environmental liabilities).   
2.5 Public sector vs. For-profit organizations 
Finally, we expect the primary performance targets for a public sector organization to 
be somewhat different from those in for-profit firms (Kraus and Lind, 2010; Atkinson et al., 
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1997). The potential for conflicting objectives is particularly strong in public sector 
organizations because the overriding purpose is not as clear as in private companies—to 
generate profits for the shareholders (Arnaboldi and Azzone, 2010).7 Due to this non-profit 
nature, perhaps other stakeholders besides only shareholders have a higher impact on a public 
organization than on a private firm. In addition to an unclear purpose, the ownership structure 
is often unclear in public sector organizations (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). These two 
issues might be reasons why Arnaboldi and Azzone (2010) claimed that public sector 
organizations have difficulties in setting targets.8 In their 11-year longitudinal study of a 
university, they found that defining a single key measure was never pursued. In this study, we 
investigate whether the performance targets for a public sector organization are primarily 
financial measures as is common in for-profit firms (Kraus and Lind, 2010; Atkinson et al., 
1997), and if not, how they are different and why. 
 
3. Research method 
We adopt an exploratory qualitative case study approach (Ryan, Scapens and 
Theobald, 2002; Sundin et al., 2010). This approach allows us to gather information about the 
influence of stakeholders and resource dependency—as well as the PMS design and key 
measures—for an organization that is not available through public sources or survey data. We 
began with a theoretical model informed by previous research. Next, we investigate the case 
organization at a very detailed level using multiple sources of evidence to more fully develop 
our theoretical model. We applied abduction reasoning when we developed theoretical 
explanations to empirical observations (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Lukka and Modell, 2010). 
                                                 
7 Broadbent and Guthrie (2008) review the literature on public sector accounting studies. Modell (2009) focused 
more particularly on the public sector PMS accounting literature with institutional theory. 
8 According to Arnaboldi and Azzone (2010), other difficulties of PMS implementation were related to the 
diverse nature of services, the wide range of users and lack of competencies in the public sector.  
14 
Therefore, the final version of the theoretical model in Figure 1 was developed after 
reviewing the literature and analyzing empirical observations.  
  
3.1 The case organization  
Several criteria were used to select the case organization for the study. First, we 
wanted to study a public organization. Due to its non-profit nature, more stakeholders may 
have an impact on a public organization’s PMS than in a for-profit firm. We also wanted to 
study how the primary performance targets for a public sector organization differ from those 
in for-profit firms. The second and third criteria were of a more practical nature. The second 
criterion was that the case organization needed to be willing to participate in the research 
project so that we could have good access. The third criterion was that the organization 
should be one that has been reported on in the media, indicating the importance of the 
organization to the local area as well as enabling the use of different data sources such as 
newspaper articles.  
The case University of Applied Sciences (hereafter XUAS) met well the criteria for 
this study.9 The Finnish higher education system has two types of systems: universities of 
applied sciences (UAS) and universities.10 The universities conduct scientific research and 
provide graduate and postgraduate education. The UAS educate professionals in response to 
labor market needs and conducts R&D that supports education and promotes regional 
development in particular (MEC, 2010). All Finnish universities are public and students are 
selected by an exam. The tuition is free for the students after they have passed the exam.  
The first university of applied sciences started to operate in 1991. The total number of 
UAS students is 130,000 and it awards over 20,000 Bachelor-level degrees and 200 Master-
                                                 
9 The acronym “XUAS” is used when referring to the case organization.  
10 The acronym “UAS” refers all the universities of applied sciences in Finland including XUAS. 
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level degrees annually (MEC, 2010). In 2010, there were 25 different UAS in Finland. XUAS 
has several thousand students and offers about 20 different Bachelor-level and five Master-
level degree programs. XUAS has several different units in different municipalities. XUAS 
main campus with several XUAS units is located in a municipality that is a regional center of 
the area. The maximum distance between different units in XUAS is about two hundred 
kilometers. All XUAS units are located within one hundred kilometers from the main campus 
of XUAS. XUAS is owned by a municipal consortium (MC). 
3.2 Data gathering and analysis 
The empirical data was collected via six preliminary interviews and twenty three 
semi-structured follow up interviews. All the people interviewed are listed in the Appendix. 
The preliminary interviews were conducted by one of the researchers of this study. The 
preliminary interviews were not voice-recorded but field notes were taken during interviews. 
The purpose of these preliminary interviews was to gather more information about the future 
research project and gauge the interest level. The preliminary interviews investigated the 
general PMS and management control environment in the case organization. Follow up 
interviews also investigated the stakeholders and their expectations.  
We selected different types of interviewees to achieve a better understanding of the 
phenomena. We interviewed internal parties such as students, unit management and XUAS 
board level directors. We also interviewed XUAS external parties such as representatives of a 
municipality, the national government, and some local firms. We had good access to XUAS. 
Therefore, we were able to interview all the representatives necessary for our research 
purposes.  
At least two researchers participated in the semi-structured interviews to help ensure 
the accuracy, relevance, and validity of interview data (see also Li and Tang, 2009). A 
research assistant also participated in some interviews when XUAS internal parties were 
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interviewed so that the assistant could transcribe the voice recordings more easily. All the 
interviews were voice recorded and transcribed into text later. We usually spent from 90 
minutes to two hours with those interviewed. The duration of recorded interviews varied from 
fifty to one hundred minutes. Some interviews were conducted after the first interviews 
revealed unexpected and important stakeholders for the organization. All the interviews were 
conducted in the interviewees’ native language which was Finnish. Therefore, all the 
quotations in this paper have been translated into English. Consequently, different shades of 
meaning may emerge due to translation, even though we have tried to be extremely careful in 
conducting the translation. 
The empirical data analysis started by indexing and identifying the stakeholders. The 
indexes were used to explore and connect the interests of stakeholders and their targets. Next, 
we analyzed the different resources of stakeholders because earlier studies have indicated that 
resource dependency and criticality has an effect on control systems. In addition to interview 
data, we also accessed public data sources and internal documents for identifying the issues 
and connected them to findings of the interviews using the same indexing system.  
We have utilized several data sources to increase the reliability of the results 
(McKinnon, 1988; Sundin et al., 2010; Vaivio, 2008).  First, we utilized several different 
types of data including annual reports, public documents (i.e., the web-pages of UAS and 
Ministry of Education and Culture, Finnish acts and laws, Finnish statistics, newspapers), 
internal documents (i.e., financial statements, quality assurance manual, performance 
measurement reports), personal e-mails (sent to all employees by researchers), interviews and 
direct observation. We had access to XUAS intranet. Second, we had several different 
participants in the interviews. The interviewees varied according to their organizational 
position. We interviewed both internal and external parties of XUAS. Third, at least two 
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researchers participated in all interviews (with exception of the preliminary interviews). 
Fourth, we allowed as much time for interviewing and observing as was required. 
 
4. Case Description  
This section discusses the case study findings and begins by identifying the key 
stakeholders, their interests, and their performance targets that impact PMS design. Next, we 
identify the kinds of resources that different stakeholders provide, and how certain 
stakeholders and their resources affect the key XUAS performance measure.  
4.1 Key stakeholders and their interests 
The interviews revealed several different stakeholders. One of the most frequently 
mentioned stakeholders was the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). Another 
frequently mentioned group of stakeholders was the municipalities where XUAS is located. 
The importance of these two entities can be observed from the following quotation:  
“There are two institutes who offer financial resources: the government, or the 
MEC, and the municipalities. They are important stakeholders when we are 
considering external stakeholders” (XUAS president). 
 
Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). One of the most important stakeholders 
is the MEC because it provides a large part of the financial resources for XUAS. According 
to XUAS financial statements, the MEC provides the largest proportion of financial resources 
to XUAS. Although over half of MEC’s financial resources provided to UAS were collected 
from Finnish municipalities, the financial support from municipalities flows to different 
universities in UAS, including XUAS, through the MEC. Thus, the MEC holds a gatekeeper 
position regarding the financial resources. The MEC launched a structural development 
program in March 2008 which set a goal that the maximum number of Finnish UAS is to be 
18, each with at least 2,500 full-time students by 2020. Achieving this goal requires structural 
changes (i.e., UAS mergers or closures) because there were 25 different universities of 
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applied sciences including six that had less than 2,500 full-time students when the structural 
development program was launched. This target was mentioned extensively in several 
different interviews. An interviewed MEC director explained that successful UAS is able to 
change its structure:  
“The successful UAS [in general] has been capable of rearrangements—able to 
get out of the old mode of action and is open-minded to new structural changes 
that enable it to take the next development phase. Thus, different UAS have been 
the best in different eras… [The successful UAS] is capable of clearly specifying 
its future prospects; the strategy has to be able to delete [something old], not just 
include all existing operations so that everybody would be happy” (Director of 
education, MEC). 
 
According to the structural development program of the MEC, UAS performance is 
evaluated by the following criteria: attractiveness (i.e., number of student applicants per 
number of new students), time to graduate, number of scientific publications, effective 
resource utilization, student employment, and lifelong learning. The evaluation of these 
different criteria is conducted annually and all units within Finnish UAS are ranked against 
each other. The MEC sent written feedback to all the UAS units during the time of our field 
research.11 The XUAS received the following feedback, which is particularly focused on the 
“attractiveness” of degree programs:  
“The structure of degree programs needs to be restructured [in XUAS]. The 
attractiveness of the degree programs has been below the Finnish UAS average in 
the majority of XUAS degree programs. Furthermore, the size [i.e., number of 
students] of degree programs has been below MEC suggestions in the majority of 
degree programs. The attractiveness ratios have been very low especially in 
[certain specifically named] units and municipalities.” (MEC feedback to UAS, 
November 12, 2010) 
 
                                                 
11 The MEC sent another feedback report to XUAS in October 2011. Due to low attractiveness ratios in the 
feedback report, MEC forced XUAS to close three specified units. All the units were located outside of XUAS 
main campus in smaller municipalities of the region. After the XUAS reply to the feedback, the MEC sent a 
final decision to XUAS in March 2012 forcing closure of the specified units.  
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Municipalities. The municipalities were often mentioned as important stakeholders 
for XUAS. The mayor of XUAS’s largest city mentioned the importance of having qualified 
employees from XUAS.  
“XUAS is extremely important to our city and our business in this area. [XUAS] 
can stop the large part of the youth movement [to other cities]. The first target of 
our XUAS is to stay amongst those 18 remaining UAS. It is also important to our 
businesses in this area because [XUAS] educates new and qualified employees for 
them. Education and research and development are naturally very important to our 
business” (Mayor of the largest municipality in XUAS the area). 
 
  
The municipalities sometimes have conflicts between each other when they are 
defending their own interests. This conflict was observed particularly in restructuring issues, 
such as whether to close units or move them closer to the biggest city of the region.  
“When we have units in different municipalities, they recognize only their own 
narrow interests without recognizing wider issues. We have to battle this fight 
because [municipalities] do not recognize that [XUAS] benefits our province 
when we have UAS-level education and research here. This [education and 
research] contributes to our industry and business” (The Chairman of Board of 
MC & Vice Member of Board of the largest city in XUAS area)  
 
“The municipalities naturally hope the education [and units] are not moved 
anywhere and their education needs will be met [in their municipality]… I 
understand extremely well the worries of mayors about what happens when the 
UAS unit is moved away” (Vice President of XUAS). 
 
 
The plans to move XUAS units into the main campus or close by were mentioned 
extensively in local newspapers. The following are some examples.  
“Student Union would centralize the education with the main campus with certain 
conditions (Headline). … Union believes that centralization will enrich the 
substance of the degree programs, develop the quality of the education and 
improve the attractiveness.” (Local newspaper, April 22, 2011) 
 
“It is time to give up (Headline). It might be the time to give up. Everything will 
be centralized – of course. This is going to happen for instance to (XUAS) 
education in [a certain municipality]. XUAS management is reaching its long-
term goal after many years of effort. [The specific unit in XUAS] is going to be 
deserted…” (Opinion in local newspaper, April 29, 2011). 
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Local firms. Local firms are also an important group of stakeholders which can be 
found in several different places in XUAS strategy. Those interviewed mentioned the local 
firms’ importance to XUAS. One Dean commented, “We are doing applied research and it 
naturally requires some firms.” Another Dean said, “Important stakeholders are naturally 
these business partners.”  
Like the municipalities, local firms also want qualified employees from XUAS. The 
CEO of the local entrepreneurs’ organization cited this desire and recognized that the 
attractiveness of the city and XUAS are important factors for them:  
“[XUAS] teaching is extremely important for the development of this area. I think 
that [XUAS] has had a very significant impact on the attractiveness and development 
of this city during the last twenty years. Attractiveness is important. We can’t force 
anybody to come to study here. The attractiveness factor [of the city and XUAS] has 
to be good which is a challenge here… This area also needs to be attractive for 
investors so that new firms want to be established here. We can find [qualified] 
employees elsewhere if we don’t have them in this area already.” (CEO of the 
Regional Organization of Enterprises). 
 
 
Expectations for XUAS differed between local firms although they all expected 
qualified employees from XUAS. The size of the firm affected these expectations. The larger 
firms in XUAS area have different levels of cooperation with XUAS than smaller firms as 
was observed: 
“There are two types of firms: self-employed people and firms who are 
employers… the mode of cooperation differs between these self-employed people 
and employer firms… My opinion is that these larger firms understand how to 
cooperate with XUAS. The majority of firms have less than 9 employees; the 
challenge is how these smaller firms are able to cooperate [with XUAS]” (CEO of 
The Regional Organization of Enterprises). 
 
 
Students. XUAS strategy statement defines students as one of the most important 
stakeholder groups. Their importance is recognized in UAS Act (351/2003) which states that 
students must be included on the UAS board. The importance of students for XUAS was 
recognized both in interviews with students themselves and with XUAS managers. One of the 
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Deans commented, “Students are our stakeholder number 1.” The following comment is 
another example:  
 “Everybody’s ideas are recognized, the students are part of this [XUAS 
management] system. The student is in some ways a king [of the system]. Also, 
directors have said somewhere that students are the most important; without 
students this XUAS does not exist” (Secretary-general of XUAS student union). 
 
Students thought that a successful UAS is one that is attractive for students and has 
good teaching quality. The students also felt that, in addition to the UAS, the municipality 
should also be attractive. They consider higher attractiveness to affect UAS existence in the 
future:  
“The attractiveness of both [the biggest] city and UAS has been the greatest 
challenges here. I think that enough large and attractive units would be crucial. 
Attractiveness is important for the existence of this UAS. If we want this UAS to 
exist after ten years [the attractiveness is very important]” (Secretary-General of 
XUAS student union). 
 
Public organizations. Those interviewed mentioned other public organizations as 
stakeholders such as the European regional development fund (ERDF), European social fund 
(ESF), Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (TEKES), and other Finnish 
universities of applied sciences [ARENE].12 A specified public regional organization (i.e., 
hospital district) was also mentioned as an important stakeholder in the interviews. The 
importance of these public organizations, especially for research and development, can be 
observed from the following quotation, “We should apply for even more funding from [the 
Finnish] academy and TEKES although we have already applied” (Research and 
Development director of XUAS). In addition, XUAS President said, “In the field of social 
services and health care, a regional hospital district is a very important stakeholder.” 
                                                 
12 In particular, XUAS Deans mentioned that the other XUAS units are one of their important stakeholder 
groups. Quotes included: “This unit has a lot of cooperation with [XUAS] units... It [i.e., cooperation] works 
very well” (Dean), and “[The meetings with other Deans] are very important” (Another Dean). 
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These public organizations expect good research and development applications from 
XUAS which promote economic and social development. The ESF webpage states that “ESF 
reduces differences in prosperity and living standards across EU member states and regions, 
and therefore promotes economic and social cohesion.” On the other hand, the TEKES 
webpage shows that TEKES boosts wide-ranging innovation activities in research 
communities, industry, and service sectors. TEKES aims to fund research, development and 
innovation which benefit the economy and society in the long-term.  
In summary, SHT enabled us to identify the key XUAS stakeholders which are the 
MEC, municipalities, students, local firms, public funding organizations (e.g. ERDF, ESF), 
and other universities. This list indicates that XUAS has both internal (e.g. students) and 
external (e.g. firms, MEC, and municipalities) stakeholders.  
 
 
4.2 The PMS design 
The PMS design is based on the BSC approach13 and certified quality system in 
XUAS. The BSC approach was selected because it enabled XUAS to set targets and it was 
generally accepted. 
“BSC has a central role because different issues have to be measured. This approach 
of Kaplan and Norton needs to be included because it makes [the target setting 
process] more structured.” (Dean of XUAS) 
      
According to internal documents, their BSC has five perspectives which are 
customers, internal processes, partners, personnel and resources. The BSC has from two to 
six critical success factors (CSF) for each of the five perspectives. Each CSF has a specified 
indicator which is generally set for XUAS and each unit. The total number of CSF and targets 
is 18, of which only four are set for each specific XUAS unit. Fifteen targets are set and 
                                                 
13 According to the published XUAS strategy (p. 9),”13 people have been creating the XUAS strategy [for the 
years 2010-2015] including representatives of XUAS employees, students and external stakeholders”.  
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measured at the XUAS level. The strategy team tried to limit the number of targets in 
designing the PMS.  As the XUAS President stated, “We have tried to limit the number of 
strategic targets to 10-15 indicators.”  
Table 1 shows the internally published PMS design in the case organization. 
According to Table 1, the first measure in the PMS design is attractiveness and is located in 
the customer perspective. Table 1 also shows that the PMS design includes 18 different 
formal measures that reflect the interests of various stakeholders. The attractiveness measure 
supports the interests of all stakeholders to some extent, but especially the MEC. Indicators 
like Employment rate and Employment in the region reflect the interests of municipalities 
and local firms, respectively. The interests of students (e.g., Drop outs, Employment rate, 
ands Student satisfaction) and other public organizations (e.g., External finance of research, 
development and innovation (RDI)) are also considered in the PMS design.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The data for the measures are collected from financial reports, statistics, student 
surveys, personnel surveys, the course feedback system and other data sources. According to 
interviews, the PMS design was affected by two main factors: data availability and the 
interests of stakeholders. 
”BSC must be understood so that there are rough, brutal and even inappropriate 
measures. The measures need to be of this kind where we have data. It doesn’t make 
sense to create measures where data is not available easily and fast” (Vice President 
of XUAS) 
 
The working groups formulating the strategy tried to figure out the stakeholder needs 
in strategic planning rounds in 2003 and 2008. Moreover, the structure of the BSC model 
actually enabled this by labeling the perspectives as “partners,” “owners,” and “personnel” 
(later on separate perspectives for “customers” and “partners” were added).  For example, the 
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internal evaluation study, which was made after the 2002-2003 PMS development and 
strategy process, states:  
“Thinking about the future development of the BSC, both students and firms are 
desired as equal partners. From the very beginning of the BSC system and strategy 
process it was desired to use the term “partners” and not “customers”. A partner 
perspective is considered of high importance for the organization and its design has 
been successful regarding both the number of measures and the perspective. […] 
Partner perspective will probably be developed into a strong and essential perspective 
as a part of the strategy.” (BSC evaluation study, 2003) 
 
For instance, the MEC targets were included in the BSC as can be found from the 
following quotations.  
”The MEC requires quite many different measures. They should be incorporated [in 
BSC] so that we would not have two different performance measurement systems” 
(Dean of XUAS) 
 
”Majority of measures of the [MEC] ministry are also our key targets in our strategy, I 
guess that they would be also in future” (Development manager of XUAS). 
   
 
In addition to the MEC, other stakeholders have had representation on the PMS design team 
including students, entrepreneurs, and municipalities. A representative of the largest 
municipality participated in the strategy work as a member of the municipality board.  
”External stakeholders and students have always had some effect on these 
[strategic] measures.” (Development manager of XUAS)  
 
“We have participated in different development projects. We have been 
involved in [XUAS] strategy process…” (Secretary-General of XUAS student 
union)   
 
In summary, we find that the interests of the various stakeholders are carefully 
included in the PMS design at XUAS. There are also a great number of targets both at the 
unit and XUAS levels that are linked to XUAS strategy.14  Next, we discuss the resources 
provided by the different stakeholders and how they impact the key target measure at XUAS.   
                                                 
14 The case organization has also launched a specific strategy for international activities and has constructed a 
BSC for implementing the strategy. This BSC for international strategy also has targets for different CSF and 
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4.3 Resources of different stakeholders 
This section analyzes the resources that different stakeholders offer to XUAS. One of 
the most frequently mentioned stakeholders was the MEC. One reason for MEC’s importance 
is that it provides the largest part of the financial resources for XUAS operations. According 
to XUAS annual report, the MEC provides over 75 percent of total income. However, the 
MEC does not have any official representatives on XUAS board.  
Municipalities were also mentioned as a stakeholder group providing significant 
resources. As illustrated in Figure 2, municipalities provide financial resources both directly 
(arrow A) (e.g., securing loans) and indirectly via payments to the MEC (arrows B and C in 
Figure 2). According to the financial statements, the municipalities’ direct financing of 
XUAS is not as high as the financing from the MEC.15 All the Finnish municipalities have to 
pay a certain amount per habitant to the government (Salminen and Ylä-Anttila, 2010). This 
payment is reallocated by the MEC to the different UAS units for their operations.16 MEC’s 
webpages show that almost 55 percent of its financial resources are provided by the 
municipalities and the rest are provided by the Finnish national government. The payments 
by the municipalities are made even if they do not have XUAS unit in their municipality. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In addition, the municipalities in the area of XUAS own the Municipal Consortium 
(MC). According to UAS Act (351/2003), the government may grant the operating license for 
                                                                                                                                                        
includes different targets for attractiveness concerning international activities. These attractiveness targets 
include number of applicants for degree programs conducted in a foreign language and number of applicants for 
foreign study or training periods.  
15 Direct financing means that it can be verified from the financial statements of XUAS in a single revenue 
account and its provider has the power to decide whether or not to finance XUAS.  
16 This payment finances the vocational education system after the comprehensive school. UAS is a part of 
vocational education system. 
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MC17 which enables it to provide UAS-level education. The MC of XUAS is totally owned 
by 20 municipalities which are located in XUAS area. The proportion of shares for the MC 
varies between 0.05-49.5 percent among the different municipalities. The municipalities also 
have the majority of the representatives on the MC board and thus hold the formal decision 
making authority over XUAS. 
Several other public organizations such as a regional hospital district and other public 
funding agencies provide various forms of support to XUAS. According to XUAS Dean, 
“We are doing applied research… there are some required projects funded such as for ERDF, 
ESF or TEKES.” The hospital district is important as an employer for graduating students 
and as a place for student practicums. The hospital district and public funding agencies were 
important stakeholders primarily in research and development where these organizations 
provided the majority of income. Another Dean stated, “We are conducting research projects 
with municipalities and with the [regional] hospital district… The hospital district also hoped 
[specified] a degree program [to be started].” The annual report shows that these public 
organizations’ provide a relatively low proportion of total XUAS income, however. The head 
of the hospital district is also a representative on XUAS board.  
Local firms also have an official role in supporting UAS. The UAS Act (351/2003) 
requires including representatives of business and industry on the board of UAS. The local 
firms fund research projects although the annual report shows their proportion of total XUAS 
income is quite low. The local firms also have different cooperation forums for teaching in 
XUAS. The Dean commented, “We have different discussions, cooperation forums and 
research projects with them [local firms].”  
                                                 
17 According to the UAS act, the license can be granted also for a municipality, limited liability company or 
foundation.  
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Local firms also provide important support to XUAS through student projects. 
Students are required to have a practicum and thesis to earn a degree. According to the degree 
requirements, students can include project studies in their degree programs that are conducted 
with local firms and public organizations. For instance, a project could be constructing a 
market analysis for local firms.  
Of course, students provide a key resource for XUAS success: quality students. 
Students feel that XUAS attractiveness affects the qualifications of the students and the level 
of cooperation, as illustrated by the following quote:  
“XUAS attractiveness affects what kind of students we will admit to this XUAS. 
If we have a large number of applicants and we are able to choose the students, 
the [selected] students are better and have higher motivation. That way the 
students are more qualified and we can achieve better results” (Secretary-General 
of XUAS student union). 
 
Students are also a direct source of income for XUAS. According to the Finnish Act 
of Financing Teaching and Culture (1705/2009), the government pays UAS according to the 
number of students and graduates. The Act (1705/2009) states that 70% is paid based on the 
number of students in the UAS and the other 30% is paid based on the number of graduates. 
This payment method was mentioned in several different interviews, including the CFO of 
XUAS: “The degrees are very important because they drive [nowadays] 30 percent of income 
[from the government].”  
Finally, students organize the tutoring in XUAS. According to XUAS student union 
website, over 120 volunteer tutors advise, help, and counsel with students during their 
studies. All XUAS units have a tutor manager who is responsible for organizing tutor 
activities in a unit in XUAS. 
In summary, the resources provided to XUAS differ among the various stakeholders. 
The MEC clearly provided the largest amount of financial resources to XUAS, and thus its 
role as a resource provider is superior. Some stakeholders provide funding for operations but 
28 
others provide, for instance, opportunities for practicums or theses. The empirical findings for 
the XUAS are summarized in Table 2, which shows the different the types of resources that 
each major stakeholder provides, their expectations, and the measures that are important to 
them. Next, we discuss the key overall measure for XUAS.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.4 Key measure used at XUAS  
Not all of the measures in the PMS design were used in XUAS. The PMS design was 
balanced in a way taking into account different stakeholders. However, PMS use became 
very focused around one important measure. In this section, we discuss how attractiveness 
became the key measure for most of the stakeholders and why.  
Almost all interviewed mentioned that to be successful, a XUAS unit must be 
attractive  to a large number of students interested in its degree programs, as indicated by a 
high ratio of applicants to new students. The written vision of the XUAS strategy states that 
“XUAS is an attractive XUAS both from the perspectives of students and employees and its 
finances are stable.” The strategy identifies several different critical success factors for four 
different perspectives. The first critical success factor in XUAS strategy is “high 
attractiveness in all education.” In addition to the strategy, almost all XUAS Deans 
mentioned the attractiveness of XUAS as the most important factor for XUAS success, 
particularly in teaching. One Dean commented, “The attractiveness has been emphasized... 
The target of our stakeholders is definitely attractiveness and it is evaluated [by them].” 
Another Dean made the following statement: 
“The most challenging [target] is attractiveness both for all XUAS as well as in 
this XUAS unit… it is an important target because it shows whether we can or 
cannot attract the students. This attractiveness also affects the other measures such 
as how they can complete their studies and our financial profit.” 
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In addition to the Deans, the administrative director emphasized the crucial life or death 
importance of attractiveness as a key measure for XUAS success.18  
“The greatest challenges are how we can improve XUAS structural reform and 
attractiveness so that we can succeed in competition... to remain as an existing 
XUAS” [Administrative director in a published interview] 
 
Attractiveness and its development were also followed and debated in several 
newspaper articles from spring 2011 to spring 2012.  
“Strong variation in the levels of university attractiveness ratios” (Headline in 
Helsingin Sanomat, a major Finnish newspaper, April 22, 2011). 
  
“UAS of the area are attractive. (Headline) Number of applicants to XUAS  
increased by over 12 per cent. Number was the highest in the history of the 
XUAS. Result was both expected and a glad surprise. We are very happy, says the 
head of the student affairs.” (Local newspaper, April 14, 2011). 
 
“XUAS President is relieved that the school living under the shadow of MEC 
cutting list has not lost its attractiveness. […] It was a fear that degree programs 
under the threat of closing have faced big changes, but it didn’t happen. […] We 
have to act in a way that viable degree programs can continue, states XUAS 
President directing the decisions.” (Local newspaper, April 26, 2012)   
 
Attractiveness was even called a “super measure” in different interviews. The level of 
this measure was discussed in different internal and external meetings. The attractiveness 
ratio was discussed in target negotiations with MEC and internally in steering groups and 
meetings for employees.19 The target negotiations with MEC are important because the MEC 
                                                 
18 For the R&D area, XUAS has a different target than attractiveness. The primary target of R&D is financial 
income and especially EBITDA. XUAS President commented, “In the R&D profit center … the financial 
income target relating to EBITDA is important.” XUAS Research and development director and a dean 
emphasized the importance of external financing as an important measure in R&D. Some interviewed 
mentioned also the importance of balanced budget as an important measure in the following quotation: 
“Naturally, financial measures are important. We get budget numbers monthly from CFO… how much we have 
spent [money] and how much [money] we have remaining so that the [budget] is balanced” (A dean). When 
another dean was asked about the key measures he is controlling, he replied, “I’m controlling financial issues 
and attractiveness measures.”  
19 During observation in several internal meetings for employees, we found that almost all of them explicitly 
showed the ratios for attractiveness and number of applicants. 
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decides the number of students—which drives the majority of XUAS income—and programs 
after these discussions.   
“These attractiveness ratios, number of education programs and their size are 
considered [during target negotiations with MEC]… [the MEC] actually asks, ‘Do 
you need this program because the number of applicants [i.e. attractiveness] is so 
[low in this program]?’ (Chairman of Board of MC & Vice Member of board of 
the largest city in XUAS area). 
“Super measure is evaluated in target negotiations with MEC. Super measure is 
attractiveness” (Manager of student placement)  
 “In our internal target negotiations the attractiveness ratio is emphasized. I feel in 
that way. It might be that there are also other measures but this measure is it [most 
important]” (Dean of XUAS) 
 
We observed several reasons why attractiveness became such an important key 
measure for XUAS. First, the MEC perceived serious inefficiencies in the UAS. In 40 of 170 
degree programs, the average attractiveness ratio less than 1.5 (i.e., less than 1.5 applicants 
per new student) (Salminen and Ylä-Anttila, 2010). In addition, according to MEC statistics, 
some universities of applied sciences had overall attractiveness ratios less than 2.0. Achieving 
attractiveness targets has been the hardest goal to achieve for XUAS. Because attractiveness 
has been low and below the target, it is one of the biggest challenges and threats for XUAS. 
To address the perceived inefficiencies, the MEC launched its structural development 
program to increase average UAS unit size and decrease the number of UAS units. UAS 
attractiveness and effectiveness in resource utilization became two indicators used to 
compare Finnish UAS and measure success in the structural development program. 
Attractiveness was considered the best way to measure and compare performance among the 
various units to help decide which units to close or merge. And XUAS’s high dependency on 
the MEC for funding enables the MEC to determine the key measure for XUAS.  
A second reason for attractiveness being the key measure is the imbalance between 
educational demand and supply. UAS educational demand may be decreasing for the future 
based on Statistics Finland, which reports a 15% decrease in the birth rate from 1990 to 2002. 
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On the other hand, UAS cost per student has increased over 20% from 2006 to 2010 (FNBE, 
2010, p. 6). The increased costs of education have been reported by MEC’s structural 
development program, which states that “improving [operational] efficiency requires changes 
in the operational environment when [individual UAS units] are developed.” Thus, reducing 
educational costs became very important for the whole system, and attractiveness provides a 
way of determining the efficiency of UAS programs. 
Third, there were a number of students who do not graduate within the target period 
of time, or worse, never graduate. Both issues have led to increasing ”waste” in the education 
system (Salminen and Ylä-Anttila, 2010). Attractiveness has a statistically significant 
positive correlation with the graduation success and a negative correlation with the ratio of 
students not graduating, known as the “wastage ratio” (Pääkkönen, 2010). According to 
Pääkkönen (2010, 43), “The lower-motivated students get placed in a less attractive 
universities within the UAS with less attractive degree programs. The lower-motivated 
students waste their studies more frequently than other students” (Pääkkönen, 2010, 43).  
Fourth, the municipalities wanted to retain XUAS campuses in their municipality 
district. This desire has at least partly contributed to the fragmentation in the UAS 
educational system.  MEC could not by itself directly close any UAS university or its 
subunits, but it was able to force closures by allocating fewer financial resources. This 
relationship is described in the following citation: 
“Decisions concerning the XUAS units are done locally, and we have to accept 
that in the MEC at least so far. … MEC wishes that XUAS units will not just wait 
for a slow death, but accelerate the development.” (Director of Higher Education 
and Science, Local Newspaper, May 12, 2011)  
 
Part of this allocation decision was based on incentives paid to “successful” UAS 
units. Success was typically defined based on attractiveness, driven by the ability of UAS to 
make structural changes (unit closures or removal to a central city area). Attractiveness 
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became the single most important criteria and key indicator of success in XUAS because the 
local municipalities were unlikely to make any structural changes due to the fact that they 
wanted to retain XUAS units in their own municipality. 
A fifth important reason for attractiveness becoming the key indicator is its 
importance to students. It is important to students because it measures the preferences of 
young people concerning subjects, area of education, location, and the overall UAS unit 
(Pääkkönen, 2010). Our stakeholder analysis revealed that both students and local firms 
recognized the relation between improved attractiveness and the qualifications of students 
coming out of XUAS.  
In summary, three primary stakeholders—MEC, municipalities, and students—have 
had considerable impact on why attractiveness is a key XUAS target. Figure 3 illustrates the 
process of how attractiveness became the most important indicator and what kinds of 
outcomes were associated with improvement on this key indicator. Municipalities wanted to 
retain their XUAS units and MEC wanted to restructure the fragmented and inefficient UAS 
educational system. The core of this conflict was the financial arrangement in which the 
payments of municipalities to the MEC are reallocated to different XUAS units by the MEC. 
This arrangement increased XUAS resource dependency on the MEC and enabled the MEC 
to determine the key indicator for XUAS. Focusing on and improving attractiveness provided 
several observed outcomes, including more qualified students, improved efficiency and less 
waste, more desirable programs to attract students to XUAS, substantial economic impact to 
cities losing XUAS units, and increased migration of young people to larger cities. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
5. Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the findings of this study in relation to the original research 
question, the PMS literature, and the related theories. First, we discuss how stakeholder 
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theory helps explain the impact of various stakeholder interests on PMS design. Second, we 
explain how resource dependency theory helps explain which measures are used for decision 
making. Third, we suggest some implications of not including some stakeholders’ interests in 
the selection of the key target measures. Finally, we discuss why the key measure for a public 
sector organization is nonfinancial rather than financial and why this matters.  
5.1 Stakeholder interests in PMS design and use 
SHT predicts that different stakeholders have different expectations of an 
organization, and we observed that these expectations translated into different targets in the 
PMS design such as proposed in the framework of Ferreira and Otley (2009). This study finds 
both competing and congruent expectations among stakeholders (Collier, 2008). An example 
of competing interests is that municipalities would like to retain all the small XUAS units in 
their municipality whereas the MEC wanted larger XUAS units. Congruent interests include 
both the municipalities and the ministry expecting the UAS to be attractive and able to 
cooperate with local firms.   
As suggested by the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 1 and exemplified by 
Figure 3 for the case organization, the result of the varied and sometimes conflicting 
stakeholder interests is a balanced scorecard design consisting of a large number (18) of 
different measures (see Tables 1 and 2). Although SHT explains well the PMS design, 
resource dependency theory better explains PMS usage. The varied expectations were made 
more congruent because the battle for survival of XUAS and its units was based on 
attractiveness. The stakeholder with dominant financial resources looked at attractiveness as a 
key indicator in monitoring XUAS. In order to survive, the XUAS and its units were forced 
to monitor the same measure and make efforts to increase attractiveness in several ways.  
The conflicting interests between stakeholders seem to be balanced in the PMS design 
when the interests were turned into explicit targets (see Sundin et al., 2010). However, 
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although the interests seem to be balanced in PMS design, they were not balanced in actual 
PMS use. The interviews consistently identified attractiveness as a key or “super” target in 
PMS use. The results show clearly that PMS design and PMS use are two very different 
phases and concepts (e.g. Ferreira and Otley, 2009) and the variability of the stakeholders’ 
interests is much easier to observe in the PMS design phase. Together, this study contributes 
to earlier SHT studies in the PMS domain by showing that despite conflicting interests among 
various stakeholders in the PMS design, the key target used was congruent among all 
stakeholders.    
5.2 Impact of resource dependency on key measure used 
Resource dependency theory helps explain how a few primary stakeholders can 
impact the selection of the key target measure in use. Consistent with our theoretical model 
(see Figures 1 and 2), the dependency of XUAS on its largest financial resource provider 
(MEC) became a filter that greatly affected XUAS strategy and key measure. MEC became 
the largest resource provider when it had power to allocate financial resources from both 
government and municipalities to the different UAS universities. The dependency of the 
XUAS on these resources enabled the MEC to make attractiveness the leading performance 
indicator in PMS use.  
However, other stakeholders besides the MEC also mentioned extensively the 
importance of XUAS attractiveness. It is understandable that the internal stakeholders (such 
as UAS deans and managers) of XUAS mentioned this measure launched by the MEC 
because they are also directly controlled by this key resource provider. The surprising issue is 
that external stakeholders also mentioned this same measure as a key target in their 
interviews. One reason might be that media attention given to the threat of decreasing the 
number of UAS or closing the XUAS units has impacted other stakeholders also. Other 
stakeholders recognize the closure threat as a political constraint when they considered key 
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targets (see more from Li and Tang, 2009). Another reason might be the expected outcomes 
of that key measure. Attractiveness was considered important for improving the efficiency of 
the UAS educational system, teaching quality and helping ensure qualified employees for 
local firms.  
These findings indicate that the key resource provider was able to institutionalize 
(e.g., Burns and Scapens, 2000) this measure (attractiveness) into the realm of XUAS and its 
stakeholders. These results are consistent with Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, pp. 46-47, 259) 
who propose that stakeholder control over an organization is affected by its resource 
criticality and scarcity. Someone may consider it unsurprising that the stakeholder providing 
the most resources had the highest impact on PMS use. The surprising issue was that all 
stakeholders, regardless of amount of resources provided, mentioned the same key target. 
Thus, it may be that the key resource provider also has some impact on the expectations of 
other stakeholders. Therefore, the stakeholder with the most resources may have two different 
roles in PMS use: (1) it can force elimination of the conflicting interests between the 
stakeholders (i.e. filter in Figure 1 and 2), and (2) it may impact the expectations of other 
stakeholders. In summary, this study contributes to earlier PMS studies by combining RDT 
and SHT, as supported by Christopher (2010) and Hillman et al. (2009).     
5.3 Implications of excluding some stakeholders’ interests  
As proposed by the theoretical model, the filtering of various scorecard measures into 
a key measure based on resource dependency led to some desired outcomes for most 
stakeholders (see Figure 3).  Focusing on attractiveness increases the level of qualifications 
required for students, leading to more qualified graduates for municipalities and local firms. 
It also helped to improve graduation rates and efficiency (i.e., less waste) by measuring 
student preferences and placing more motivated and qualified students in XUAS units with 
more attractive degree programs. Thus, less motivated students get weeded out.  
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However, there are also less desirable consequences for some stakeholders by not 
including their goals in the key target measures used for decision making. Stakeholders with 
competing interests not congruent with the primary resource provider or the key target 
measure may not achieve those goals. This was particularly observed in restructuring 
situations where less-attractive XUAS units and programs were either closed down or moved 
to other (usually larger) cities. The economic impact to the city is substantial for several 
reasons, such as fewer employees available to local firms in these cities, higher 
unemployment in these cities due to education being more difficult to obtain, less qualified 
students for R&D projects in those areas, and increased migration of young people to other 
cities. These issues make the municipality less attractive to qualified employees and potential 
students due to fewer educational academic programs. If the programs are not attractive, they 
will be phased out. Thus, another consequence is fewer program choices for students.  
Excluding some stakeholders’ goals from the primary measures used also added 
tension within XUAS organization. Particularly those XUAS units which had a low value in 
one key ratio tried to prioritize and show their success in other ratios (e.g., employment rate 
or external finance) or the general importance of a specific program (e.g., demand in future, 
national or local importance). The purpose of these attempts was to question the validity of 
the key measure and provide alternative key measures. However, this criticism was 
effectively eliminated by the key stakeholder who forced the closure of XUAS units with the 
lowest attractiveness ratios, resulting in many employee lay-offs. 
The less desirable consequences of XUAS closures have implications for SHT. 
Stakeholders whose requirements are fulfilled in the PMS design but effectively ignored in 
PMS usage tried to affect the selection of a key measure as long as possible. The tension 
between XUAS units (and their location cities) relating to successful and unsuccessful 
attractiveness was highly visible (e.g., in local newspapers) as a political issue. Because of 
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these tensions, some compromises should have been made between the units in closing some 
degree programs to balance the situation, but were not. These consequences present a 
challenge to the implementation of SHT, which argues that the utility of a large number of 
different stakeholders, including shareholders, is maximized when the firm strives to 
integrate stakeholder needs through multiple objectives (Christopher, 2010; see also Freeman 
et al., 2004). If competing interests are filtered out by resource dependency on primary 
stakeholders, satisfying the utility of many stakeholders will be difficult at best.  
5.4 Why the key measure is nonfinancial  
Finally, we discuss why the key measure for a public sector organization is 
nonfinancial rather than financial and why this matters. This finding was surprising because 
the importance of nonfinancial measures was not assumed in the lights of value maximization 
theories (Jensen, 2001). According to these theories, all stakeholders’ interests are taken into 
account sufficiently by maximizing profit. The nonfinancial measure (i.e. attractiveness) 
became extremely important and the one single leading indicator (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) 
for all stakeholders as well as for corporate and unit-level managers to use. Public 
organizations may focus more on nonfinancial indicators for organizational control or 
achieving their mission than private companies. However, in this case, attractiveness was a 
major leading indicator because it leads both directly and indirectly to better financial results 
(i.e., payments based on number of students, number of degrees, result-based incentive fees, 
and the restructurings of XUAS units). Thus, although financial results are the ultimate 
lagging indicators, certain nonfinancial targets can become the key measure for an 
organization due to its recognized impact on financial outcomes. 
The finding that the key performance measure used for decision making can be 
nonfinancial if it is a key driver of financial outcomes may have implications for firms 
pursuing a more balanced approach to performance measurement. In the balanced scorecard 
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approach, financial measures serve as the focus for all of the other nonfinancial perspectives 
and measures. According to Kaplan and Norton (1996, p. 47), “every measure selected 
should be part of a link of cause-and-effect relationships that culminate in improving 
financial performance.” If there is one key nonfinancial measure that drives financial 
outcomes, organizations may feel more comfortable focusing on that measure because they 
know it will lead to stronger financial results. If there is not one key nonfinancial measure, 
but several nonfinancial measures as part of the cause-and-effect chain leading to financial 
results, firms may find it easier to focus on financial measures as the ultimate target 
measures. This idea may help explain the emphasis on financial measures in firms using a 
balanced scorecard approach found in previous studies (Kraus and Lind, 2010). 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we investigate the difference between PMS design and use by 
investigating stakeholders’ effect on the performance measurement system (PMS). Generally, 
our results indicate that PMS design and PMS use are two very different phases and concepts 
(e.g. Ferreira and Otley, 2009). The conflicting interests between stakeholders were balanced 
in PMS design when the interests were turned into explicit targets. However, although the 
interests became balanced in PMS design (like Sundin et al. (2010) predicted), they were not 
so balanced in actual PMS use. Instead of conflicting interests resulting in multiple key 
targets in PMS use, one nonfinancial indicator—attractiveness—became the most important 
key target in PMS use. Resource dependency helped to explain how a few primary 
stakeholders impact the selection of the key target measures used.   
Attractiveness, or the number of applicants per number of new students, became the 
most important key target. This finding adds to Kraus and Lind (2010) which found that 
corporate level control was primarily financially-focused in Swedish companies. It may be 
that public organizations focus more on nonfinancial indicators than profit-oriented firms due 
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to their nonprofit mission. However, attractiveness was also a major leading indicator for 
better financial results and, moreover, it was a crucial for the survival of XUAS and its units 
due to the threat of closures or mergers by the MEC. Thus, although financial results may be 
the ultimate lagging indicators, certain nonfinancial targets can become the key measures for 
an organization in PMS use due to its impact on financial outcomes or even on its existence. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that one “super” nonfinancial measure was able to balance 
differing stakeholder objectives. Future studies could identify other contexts where 
nonfinancial measures are the key targets, especially in for-profit firms. 
This study differs from earlier PMS studies with SHT by developing a theoretical 
model that suggests resource dependency acts as a “filter” in selecting certain measures as 
primary from all the stakeholder-driven measures in the PMS use. Combining stakeholder 
theory and resource dependency theory with the results of this and previous case studies, we 
propose the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 1 and exemplified by Figure 3 for the case 
organization. This filtering leads to both desirable and undesirable consequences for 
stakeholders and the organization. Those stakeholders with goals not congruent with the 
primary resource providers or key measures are less likely to achieve those goals. It can also 
add to the risks that could threaten the long-term viability of XUAS itself. We recommend 
testing the potential of this framework with wider empirical evidence through fieldwork or 
statistical analysis to test how these outcomes differ in for-profit settings. Perhaps a key 
customer or market segment that provides the most profits for a firm serves as the primary 
resource provider and drives the key measures used.  
The results of the study have two theoretical implications. First, the expectations of 
stakeholders need to be identified as proposed by SHT and translated into specific 
performance indicators in the design of PMS as illustrated in our model. The inclusion of 
different indicators in the PMS design enables organizations to show they are cognizant of 
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the specific expectations of different stakeholders. This inclusion may improve the feeling 
among stakeholders that their expectations are considered when PMS are used. Second, it 
may be possible to predict the use of PMS by combining SHT and RDT theories as presented 
in our model. By using this model, the most important critical success factor(s) for success 
and survival of a public sector organization may be identified. These “rules of the game” are 
set by the major resource provider and recognized by the other stakeholders. The model calls 
this phenomena “filtering.”  
In addition to the theoretical model, this study differs from earlier PMS studies using 
stakeholder theory. According to the results, although the interests of stakeholders may differ, 
performance measurement and management may still have a single key objective. This partly 
contradicts earlier studies such as Li and Tang (2009) who proposed that “stakeholder theory 
fails to provide corporate managers with a single objective.” SHT illustrated why PMS design 
has many and sometimes conflicting measures. However, the finding of a single key 
objective is consistent with the suggestion of Jensen (2001) that purposeful action requires a 
single valued objective function. In this study, the objective function consisted of one 
variable: attractiveness. 
An alternate explanation for why the key XUAS objective was balanced between 
stakeholders may be that XUAS was owned by municipalities. Sundin et al. (2010) found that 
a state-ownership structure may have led to balanced objectives in their case company. 
However, the ownership structure of XUAS is somewhat different because the MEC is not an 
“owner” of XUAS although it pays the largest amount of XUAS financial resources and 
holds a dominant gatekeeper position for those resources. On the other hand, the MEC is also 
able to affect UAS by other modes of control such as by legislation. Therefore, this study 
extends the findings of Sundin et al. (2010). Although municipalities own XUAS and their 
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interests often conflict with each other (e.g., each wants to have XUAS unit in their 
municipality), the overriding objective (XUAS attractiveness) can still be similar. 
Finally, we find specific resource dependencies and collected empirical data to 
support the idea that both internal and regulatory stakeholders have impact on the KPI, which 
is consistent with Darnall et al. (2009). Contrary to Darnall et al. (2009), however, we find 
that an external, regulatory stakeholder (i.e., MEC) had the most impact on the selection of a 
KPI and probably also the expectations of other stakeholders. This same KPI was mentioned 
by other stakeholders such as students and municipalities. Darnall et al. (2009) suggests that 
internal stakeholders have the most impact on KPI selection. However, the Darnall et al. 
(2009) study focuses on environmental issues in private manufacturing firms as opposed to 
this study which focuses on PMS issues in a public non-manufacturing organization. 
The results of this study should be considered in light of certain limitations. First, the 
impact of stakeholders on public sector organizations might be very different than that for 
private sector organizations with for-profit objectives. Future studies could test whether 
primary targets are always financial and which stakeholders besides shareholders have the 
most influence on key targets in for-profit organizations. Second, we applied a longitudinal 
qualitative single case study method which does not allow for statistical analysis. This 
limitation suggests the need for more studies with quantitative methods for more 
generalizable results. Third, PMS are only one component of the overall management control 
system. An interesting issue for future studies would be how stakeholders affect wider 
management control system (MCS) patterns (Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007) 
in addition to PMS design and PMS use. 
Although this study is limited to a single case organization, it identifies stakeholders 
and their expectations in more detail than earlier studies (e.g. Atkinson et al., 1997; Kraus 
and Lind, 2010; Li and Tang, 2009; Sundin et al., 2010). The major finding and contribution 
42 
of the study is that the conflicting interests of stakeholders do not automatically lead to a 
large number of key indicators used in decision making, which contradicts the basic 
proposition of stakeholder theory. We propose a theoretical model suggesting that the process 
of selecting key nonfinancial indicators is complex. The resources supplied by stakeholders 
can significantly impact which measures are focused on. We hope future PMS research will 
test this theoretical model and find it helpful.  
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Figure 1. Theoretical framework for the study 
 
 
Multiple stakeholders with conflicting interests 
(as suggested by stakeholder theory) 
 PMS Design: 
Multiple & conflicting measures 
 FILTER: Resource-dependency on the most critical resource 
provider(s) (as suggested by resource-dependency theory): 
PMS Use: 
The key measure(s) used for 
decision making 
Expected outcomes: 
 More resources to implement 
strategy  
 Higher motivation, learning, 
and profitability 
 Decisions more consistent 
with stakeholders providing 
the most resources 
 Other important stakeholder 
interests not met 
 Higher long-term risks to 
organization viability 
 
Figure 2. Municipalities’ direct and indirect financing of XUAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         B                  C 
 
   A 
 
 
 
Note: Arrow A illustrates direct financing of XUAS which means that it can be verified from 
the financial statements of XUAS in a single revenue account and the municipalities have 
power to decide whether or not to finance XUAS. Arrows B & C illustrate indirect financing 
of XUAS by the municipalities through the MEC.   
Municipalities 
Ministry of education 
& culture (MEC) 
Case organization (XUAS) 
Finnish national 
government 
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Figure 3. Forces for the selection of a key target and expected outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PMS Design: Reflect conflicting interests such as 
 MEC: restructure fragmented UAS to be more efficient 
 Municipalities: retain UAS units in municipality 
 Students: desirable programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FILTER:  Resource dependency 
 Municipalities pay taxes to MEC 
 MEC reallocates funds to different units in UAS 
(increasing resource dependency on MEC) 
 MEC starts Structural Development Program which relies 
on attractiveness as a key driver for resource allocation 
 
Key Measure: UAS Attractiveness 
No. of student applicants 
No. of new students 
 
Observed outcomes: 
 More qualified graduates (for XUAS 
city and local firms) 
 Improved efficiency (more students 
graduating; more attractive programs) 
 Lower waste (e.g., decreased time to 
graduate, fewer XUAS campuses) 
 Less attractive XUAS units closed 
 Substantial economic impact to cities 
losing XUAS units 
 Fewer qualified employees available 
in those cities losing XUAS units 
 Increased migration of young people 
to larger cities 
 
Stakeholders:  MEC, municipalities, students, local firms, 
and other public organizations  
Table 1. PMS design in case organization 
 
Critical success factor 
 
Indicator 
Target *: 
Unit level 
Target*: 
UAS level 
1. Customers    
-Attractiveness in all education programs Number of applicants ÷ by number of new students X X 
-Satisfied, well-motivated and committed students Drop outs X X 
-Internationally known and wanted XUAS for foreign students  Student satisfaction  X X 
-Students' capabilities and orientation for entrepreneurship Entrepreneurship of students X X 
-Professional skills and employment of graduated students  Employment Rate X X 
-Leading role as an innovator in XUAS area RDI awareness X** X 
2. Processes    
-Qualified and profitable teaching EBITDA in teaching and RDI X X 
-Qualified and profitable RDI External finance of RDI X X 
-Establishment of quality work Achievements in key processes X X 
-Systematic prediction of a new teaching possibilities Not defined X** No 
3. Employees    
-Motivating atmosphere for own knowledge capabilities Number of education days per employee X X 
-Supporting own knowledge and spirit of entrepreneurship Work development X X 
-Welfare of employees  Satisfaction of employees X X 
4. Owners (financier)    
-Regional balance in education and RDI with national targets Qualitative assessment: MEC feedback & Stakeholders' panel X** No 
-Responding to the knowledge requirements in area Employment in region X X 
5. Partners    
-Improving co-operation with universities in the region Project and teaching co-operation with strategic partners X** No 
-Essential role in regional internationalization by int. partners Number of international students X X 
-XUAS co-operation in strategic priorities Number of co-operation agreements in prioritized areas X*** X 
* Specific ratios for targets are not presented due to data confidentiality  
** Only for one (and same) unit in XUAS; *** Only in two XUAS units  (another is same unit as above)  
Table 2 Summary of stakeholders, their expectations, resources and linkage to key performance measure in PMS design 
Stakeholder 
Stakeholder resources Stakeholders expectations Key Performance Measures 
External stakeholders:     
Ministry (MEC)  Financial (over 75 % of UAS 
budget. Over 50% of that is 
collected from municipalities and 
less than 50 % from government) 
 Attractive and efficient degree 
programs 
 Large XUAS 
 Renewal capability of XUAS 
 Attractiveness in all education 
programs 
 Drop outs, employment rate 
 MEC qualitative feedback 
Municipalities  Financial (both directly and via 
MEC) 
 Securing loans for XUAS 
 Attractive municipality 
 XUAS located in municipality 
 Prevent young adult movement to 
other cities 
 Qualified employees for local firms 
 Attractiveness in all education 
programs 
 Employment in region 
 External finance of RDI 
Local firms  Opportunities for student theses and 
practicums 
 Financial resources (esp. for R&D)  
 Qualified employees for local 
companies 
 R&D projects 
 Customized education 
 Attractiveness in all education 
programs 
 Employment in region 
 RDI awareness RDI EBITDA  
Other public organizations 
(ERDF, ESF, TEKES) 
 R&D funding  Qualified R&D projects 
 Promoting economic & social 
development 
 RDI awareness 
 EBITDA in teaching and RDI 
 External finance of RDI 
Internal stakeholders:20    
Students  MEC funding is based on number of 
students & degrees awarded 
 Employees for R&D projects 
 Tutoring new students 
 Attractive & enjoyable city 
 Teaching quality 
 Desirable programs 
 Attractiveness in all education 
programs 
 Drop outs, Student satisfaction, 
Employment rate 
 
                                                 
20 XUAS Deans considered other Deans of XUAS as important stakeholders. The deans expected that XUAS should be attractive for the students. The results indicate the key 
resource for them was benchmarking other XUAS units and XUAS unit meetings.  
Appendix: Individuals interviewed for this study 
 
Position Date Duration of 
record 
Recording (Re) & 
transcribed (Tr) 
 
Preliminary interviews 
Dean (School of technology) 
Quality officer of the unit (Business school) 
Vice President of XUAS 
Development manager of XUAS 
Dean (Business school) 
Secretary-General of XUAS student union 
 
Follow-up semi-structured interviews 
Headquarter level 
 
 
11. Aug 2008 
11. Aug 2008 
12. Aug2008 
14. Aug 2008 
14. Aug 2008 
14. Aug 2008 
 
 
 
1.5 hours 
1 hour 
1 hour 
1.5 hours 
1.5 hours 
1 hour 
 
 
Field notes 
Field notes 
Field notes 
Field notes 
Field notes 
Field notes 
 
President of XUASa 24. May 2010 53 min Re & Tr 
Vice president of XUAS 17. Aug 2010 68 min Re & Tr 
Research and development director of XUAS 17. Aug 2010 75 min Re & Tr 
Administrative director of XUASa 24. May 2010 53 min Re & Tr 
Chief financial officer (CFO) of XUAS 9. Aug 2010 47 min Re & Tr 
Quality manager of XUAS 19. Aug 2010 63 min Re & Tr 
Development manager of XUAS 22. Aug 2010 103 min Re & Tr 
IT manager of XUAS 11. Aug 2010 75 min Re & Tr 
Manager of student placement 13. Sept 2010 59 min Re & Tr 
Faculties of XUAS    
Dean (School of technology) 16. Aug 2010 103 min Re & Tr 
Dean (School of health care and social work) 26. Aug 2010 56 min Re & Tr 
Dean (School of agriculture and forestry) 16. Aug 2010 64 min Re & Tr 
Dean (School of Culture and design) 24. Aug 2010 63 min Re & Tr 
Dean (Business school) 11. Aug 2010 95 min Re & Tr 
Principal lecture & ex-dean (Business School) 19. Aug 2010 83 min Re & Tr 
Others    
Minister of the Finnish government 25. Oct 2010 54 min Re & Tr 
Mayor of the largest municipality in XUAS 
the area 
27. Aug 2010 62 min Re & Tr 
CEO of The Regional Organization of 
Enterprises in XUAS area 
29. Oct 2010 61 min Re & Tr 
The director of education in the ministry of 
education and culture (MEC) 
30. Sept 2010 80 min Re & Tr 
The chairman of board of municipal 
consortium (MC) of XUAS & The vice 
member of board of the largest city in XUAS 
area 
27. Aug 2010 79 min Re & Tr 
Secretary-general of XUAS student unionb 13. Oct 2010 77 min Re & Tr 
Chairman of XUAS student unionb 13. Oct 2010 77 min Re & Tr 
A business school student in XUASb 13. Oct 2010 77 min Re & Tr 
a, b Together    
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